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The neural correlates of theory of mind (ToM) are typically studied using 
paradigms which require participants to draw explicit, task-related inferences (e.g.
in the false belief task). In a natural setup, such as listening to stories, false belief
mentalising occurs incidentally as part of narrative processing. In our experiment,
participants listened to auditorily presented stories with false belief passages 
(implicit false belief processing) and immediately after each story answered 
comprehension questions (explicit false belief processing), while neural 
responses were measured with fMRI. All stories included (amongst other 
situations) one false belief condition and one closely matched control condition. 
For the implicit ToM processing, we modelled the hemodynamic response during 
the false belief passages in the story and compared it to the hemodynamic 
response during the closely matched control passages. For implicit mentalising 
we found activation in typical ToM processing regions, i.e. the angular gyrus 
(AG), superior medial frontal gyrus (SmFG), precuneus (PCUN), middle temporal
gyrus (MTG) as well as in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) billaterally. For explicit 
ToM we only found AG activation. The conjunction analysis highlighted the left 
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AG and MTG as well as the bilateral IFG as overlapping ToM processing regions 
for both implicit and explicit modes. Implicit ToM processing during listening to 
false belief passages , recruits the left superior medial frontal gyrus and billateral 
precuneus in addition to the ”mentalising network” known form explicit processing
tasks.
Introduction
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the cognitive capacity to attribute mental states to self
and others (Goldman, Margolis, Samuels, & Stich, 2012; Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). This capacity, which is also referred to as mentalising (e.g. C. Frith & Frith,
1999; U. Frith & Frith, 2010), is employed incidentally in a broad range of 
naturally occurring social situations. Consider, for example, a situation in which 
two friends are talking and a third joins the discussion after two minutes. The first 
two will be aware that the third will have no knowledge of their preceding 
conversation: they have a “Theory of Mind” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) that 
allows them to take on the third person’s perspective. Although the term ToM may
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appear relatively straightforward from the perspective of this initial definition, the 
rich facet of social situations where ToM is employed remains to be 
systematically categorised (Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2014). ToM is 
thought to involve a variety of sub- and super-processes (Schaafsma et al., 2014)
and can be deconstructed based on criteria such as implicit versus explicit and 
cognitive versus affective (e.g. Schlaffke et al., 2014). In addition to the 
deconstruction of the concept of ToM, and in order to quantify ToM as precisely 
as possible, a reconstruction of ToM components from basic building blocks is 
needed: for example, face recognition and gaze processing are essential for 
completing the reading the mind in the eyes test (RMET), which is a measure of 
mentalising ability (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). 
FMRI research on specific ToM tasks, such as false belief processing, can inform
this reconstruction with brain maps capturing instances of ToM, for details see 
Schaafsma et al. (2014). In spite of these multifaceted aspects of ToM, several 
meta-analyses of functional neuroimaging studies connected to ToM processing 
(Mar, 2011; Northoff et al., 2006; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 
2014; Van Overwalle, 2009) suggest that a number of regions appear to be 
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involved in ToM regardless of the specific task. These include the bilateral 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), which corresponds to the inferior portion of the 
angular and supramarginal gyri (AG, SMG) as well the posterior superior 
temporal sulcus (pSTS), superior parts of the frontal gyrus (SFG), medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and precuneus (PCUN).
Van Overwalle and colleagues first investigated another aspect of 
spontaneous ToM processing in trait attributions (Kestemont, Vandekerckhove, 
Ma, Van Hoeck, & Van Overwalle, 2013; Ma et al., 2012; Ma, Vandekerckhove, 
Van Overwalle, Seurinck, & Fias, 2011) and causal attributions (Kestemont et al.,
2014); in these studies, spontaneous and intentional ToM processing was 
manipulated between participants via the experimental instructions. In another 
study, implicit mentalising was elicited via visually presented images in the 
contrast of false vs. true belief processing (Sommer, Döhnel, Sodian, Meinhardt, 
Thoermer, & Hajak, 2007). According to a recent meta-analysis (Schurz et al., 
2014), trait attribution and false belief processing show very similar activation 
patterns. This seems meaningful conceptually because causal attributions refer 
to beliefs about a temporary event just like false beliefs. However, stimulus 
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presentation was very similar in many of the studies for trait attribution and false 
belief processing that were included in the meta-analysis: all stimuli were visual 
and included a minimal amount of contextual information.
Here, by contrast, we present the first study to employ auditory story stimuli in
conjunction with a rich situational context, within which the false belief situations 
were embedded. We assume that ToM processing in such embedded false belief 
passages is implicit because it occurs during listening to a story with the simple 
goal of keeping track of the narrative plot. If the story involves situations that 
require the attribution of mental states to others, mentalising would be a 
prerequisite for successful understanding of the plot. This notion is similar to van 
der Wel, Sebanz, & Knoblich’s (2014) automatic belief tracking, although they 
measured behaviour in the movement trajectory of a cursor while the subject was
giving their response, after having watched a short movie which involved belief 
tracking. By contrast, a situation or task in which a participant was asked to 
actively answer questions or make judgements about a person’s mental state can
be described as explicit ToM with regard to belief processing. In this case, the 




False belief processing in story comprehension
Story-based approaches as opposed to highly controlled experimental setups 
provide the opportunity of testing false belief processing in the context of a 
semantically rich, cohesive story.
The first story-based neuroimaging study on ToM was reported by Fletcher et 
al. (1995). The authors presented short stories each involving one false belief or 
control situation and examined the contrast between false belief vs. physical 
stories vs. unlinked sentences. Participants were instructed to read the stories 
and answer one question immediately after each story. They were, however, 
informed about the type of the story, i.e., in the case of false belief stories, that 
they should pay attention to people’s beliefs and intentions. Also, the authors 
modelled false belief processing during the reading of false belief and control 
passages and during the answering of a related question together. For the critical
contrast between ToM and physical stories, this study observed activation in left 




The majority of subsequent story-based neuroimaging investigation of ToM 
processing used the original false belief vignettes from the Fletcher et al. (1995) 
PET study or translations thereof and compared them to different control 
conditions. All of them presented the stories visually and modelled participants' 
reading process. For example, Vogeley et al. (2001) modified this material in 
order to cross ToM and self versus other processing. Story, question and silent 
answer were all modelled together in a block design; thus, there was no 
differentiation between implicit and explicit false belief processing. For the main 
effect of ToM, Vogeley and colleagues found differences in (among others): the 
right aCC, right superior frontal gyrus (SFG), and left lateral prefrontal cortex 
(lPFC). 
Using fMRI, Saxe & Kanwisher (2003) contrasted false belief and mechanical 
inference stories in two reading experiments and found ToM-related activation in 
the TPJ both for reading a false belief story (Experiment 1) and for reading the 
story and performing the question answering task (Experiment 2). This region 
has shown robust activation across a number of story-based studies on ToM 
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processing (Aichhorn et al., 2009; Gallagher et al., 2000; Kobayashi, Glover, & 
Temple, 2006; Lee, Quintana, Nori, & Green, 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; 
Spengler, Cramon, & Brass, 2009).
Aichhorn et al. (2009) tested the contrast of false belief vs. photograph during 
story processing and were the first to explicitly distinguish two different modes in 
ToM processing: Time point 1: Story, when the participants read the story (again, 
implicit false belief processing in reading) and Time point 2: Question, when the 
participants read and answered the question about the story (explicit false belief 
processing in reading). Their results showed activation in the middle and superior
temporal gyri (MTG, STG), superior and inferior frontal gyri (SFG, IFG) and in the 
TPJ for false belief compared to false photograph conditions at both time points. 
Also, precuneus activation was found only for the task but not for the story.
In summary, the story-based paradigms which investigated explicit false belief 
processing have identified a network comprising the following regions: mPFC, 
SFG, IFG, TPJ, MTG, and precuneus. However, all previous story-based studies 
used a block design in which one story and one answer formed one condition, 
either the false belief or the control condition. Most of these studies modelled 
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implicit and explicit ToM together in the same block (Fletcher et al., 1995; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003; Vogeley et al., 2001), with the notable exception of Aichhorn et 
al. (2009), who modelled them separately (but in reading comprehension and in 
short stories). One previous fMRI study did use auditory linguistic stimuli to 
contrast causality-related inferences with ToM-related inferences (Ferstl & 
Cramon, 2002). However, this experiment only employed minimal context and did
not distinguish between ToM-related inferences drawn during listening and task 
performance.
The design details of previous studies (mostly visual stimulation with minimal 
context and an explicit task) may have contributed to some of the inconsistencies 
about the involvement of the TPJ in false belief processing that are apparent in 
the literature (Callejas et al. 2011). More specifically, most of the above 
mentioned studies did not differentiate between components such as text 
processing or memory maintenance. The current study, by contrast, extended the
work of Ferstl & Cramon (2002) by using linguistically rich narratives and by 
embedding false belief passages into these larger contexts. This allowed us to 
model the processing of false belief passages in language comprehension 
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(implicit ToM) separately from overall story processing and decision-making 
during question answering. In comparison to previous designs, this manipulation 
should render results less sensitive, for example, to individual processing speed 
(as in reading paradigms). In addition, we aimed to capture ToM-related 
processes when reading and answering a question about false beliefs. To this 
end, we modelled reading of both question and answer options during which the 
participants manipulated the story information in order to perform the task 
(explicit ToM).
Ferstl & Cramon (2002) raised the question of the relationship between 
coherence processes in narrative comprehension and ToM processing. For both 
logical (coherence) and person-related (ToM) inferences, the results mainly 
shared frontomedian cortex (FMC) activation. The authors connect this activation 
to a domain general function of the FMC, “the initiation and maintenance of non 
automatic cognitive processes” (Ferstl & Cramon, 2002, p. 1610). This view 
accords well with a recent review on ToM, which argues that ToM-related 
processes should be decomposed into smaller subprocessing blocks 
(Schaafsma et al. 2014). From this perspective, we could assume that both 
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language and ToM are high-level functions that comprise a number of basic 
subprocesses (for a recent neurobiological perspective that advocates the 
decomposition of language into basic submechanisms, see Bornkessel-
Schlesewsky, Schlesewsky, Small, & Rauschecker, 2015). Some of the 
subprocesses might overlap: for example, one basic subprocess of ToM 
(according to Schaafsma et al., 2014) may be the understanding of causality, 
which is also a basic subprocess in the semantics of language comprehension 
(Kuperberg et al. 2011). It may be the case that, when these subprocesses 
overlap, brain activations in the respective networks are enhanced. This might be
one possibility of how linguistic and social processes like ToM interact in the 
brain, although this interaction remains to be studied more systematically.
The present study
The present fMRI study tested implicit and explicit false belief processing by 
means of a novel paradigm: a) we presented stories (approximately 2 minutes in 
length) with false belief and control situations embedded amongst a range of 
other scenarios; b) these stories were presented auditorily; and c) this design 
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allowed us to model the hemodynamic response to false belief and control events
based on their onset and duration within the two-minute-long story. We chose to 
have participants listen to the stories (instead of reading them) in order to 
increase naturalness in the setup, since reading is a culturally recent innovation 
that is less than 6000 years old (see also (Dehaene & Cohen, 2011)’s “neuronal 
recycling hypothesis”). In order to also examine explicit mentalising, we presented
participants with two questions subsequent to each story, targeting both false 
belief as well as control story content. The questions and answers were 
presented visually, in order to provide participants with various information 
modalities, which would keep them alert throughout the whole experiment.
Based on previous research on story-based false belief processing, we 
expected to observe activation for the contrast of false belief ToM vs. control 
passages during story listening (implicit false belief processing) in the mentalising
network: mPFC, SFG, IFG, MTG, precuneus and TPJ. Based on the Aichhorn et 
al. (2009) findings, we expected explicit false belief processing activation to 
manifest itself mainly in the rTPJ and SFG as part of the mPFC (see Schurz et al.





Twenty-two monolingual native speakers of German participated in the study, all 
right-handed (Edinburgh Inventory of Handedness) (age mean = 24.3 years, sd =
2.1 years, male N = 6), recruited from postings at the University of Marburg. We 
had to exclude data from two participants due to movement artefacts, resulting in 
a total of 20 datasets that entered the final analysis for the current study. The 
study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Medicine of the 
University of Marburg. All participants gave written informed consent before 
participating in the study and were paid 30 euros for participation.
Stimuli
For testing implicit ToM processing we created 20 stories with a length of 2 
minutes (±10 seconds; mean and standard deviation of story length 306 (13) 
words, 23 (4) sentences). All stories included one false belief condition (im-TOM) 
and one control condition (im-NONTOM). The 40 (im-TOM and im-NONTOM) 
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situations included a variety of social interactions: 12 every day situations e.g. 
cooking, playing, driving, 12 scenarios related to hobbies such as hiking, visiting 
an art exhibition, sports, 10 work situations in e.g. shop, office, conference, 4 
school situations (school trip, chess competition) and 2 university situations 
(department party). The common pattern of all situations was that there were two 
persons involved and one of them had a false belief. In order to comprehend 
these passages the participants needed to use their theory of mind. The control 
passages were matched in length to the false belief passages and were part of a 
physical chain of events, in which one event led to the next one. The important 
difference between false belief and control passages was the existence of 
“different minds”, the situation in which two story participants have different 
beliefs. In the analysis of the results, the even chain passages which did not 
require mentalising are referred to as control or NONTOM passages.
We developed two versions of each story as follows: version A included im-
TOM at the end of the first minute of the story and im-NONTOM (control 
passage) at the end of the second minute of the story. In version B the 
manipulation was reversed: im-NONTOM (control passage) at the end of the first 
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minute and im-TOM at the end of the second minute of the story. This design 
resulted in a total of 40 stories (20×2 minimal pairs). To avoid one participant 
hearing two versions of the same story (with a similar plot but alternating critical 
passages), we split the 40 stories into two lists of 20 stories each. One participant
heard one of the two lists in an individually randomised order: for example 
Participant 1 would hear list 1 which contained story 1A, 2B, 3B, 4A and so on, 
and Participant 2 would hear list 2 which contained story 1B, 2A, 3A, 4B and so 
on. Examples of the critical passages from two versions of the same story (1A 
and 1B) were as follows (translated from the German original):
Story 1A
• Within the first half: “[…] but his wife was so busy taking pictures of the idyllic 
landscape, so she didn’t realise, that her husband ate all the sandwiches. 
When later they arrived at the summit of Brocken, she also wanted to eat a 
sandwich, but found only drinks in her bag. She thought that maybe she had 
forgotten the food in the car.
im-TOM
 […]”
• Within the second half: “[…] The man took the camera from his backpack and 
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gave it to the hiker. The hiker put in a lot of effort and took a whole series of 
pictures from all different perspectives.
im-NONTOM
 The couple thanked him 
and went on walking. […]”
Story 1B
• Within the first half: “[...] A few minutes later she came back to her husband 
and he had already eaten three sandwiches. At the summit of the Brocken the
woman got also hungry and she found the last sandwich. With delight she ate
it and drank a few sips of apple juice.
im-NONTOM
 [...]”
• Within the second half: “[...] The man gave the camera to the hiker who 
accidentally packed it up in his backpack after photographing the couple. 
Then he went on hiking. The couple was looking for the camera without 
success,
im-TOM
 until the hiker came back and apologised many times. [...]”
Stimuli were spoken by a professionally trained female speaker of German at a 
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normal speech rate. We recorded the stimuli in a sound proof EEG laboratory 
cabin with a sampling rate of 44.1 kHz and a 16bit (mono) sample size. For 
sampling we used the sound recording and analysis software Amadeus Pro 
(version1.5.3, HairerSoft) and an Electret microphone (Beyerdynamic MC930C). 
Two example stories are available in the supplementary material.
We pre-tested the stories prior to the imaging study in order to validate their 
quality. In an online questionnaire we gathered ratings from 177 participants. The
questionnaire was distributed through a students' mailing list. Participants who 
did not fulfil the language criteria (monolingually raised German native speakers) 
were excluded from the final analysis. The participants were asked to judge 
comprehensibility (“How comprehensive was this passage?”) and naturalness 
(“How natural was this passage?”) of the auditory stimuli. Ratings were collected 
on a 4-point scale from 1 (very unnatural / incomprehensible) to 4 (extremely 
natural / comprehensible). The use of earphones was highly recommended in the
instructions of the questionnaire. An analysis using linear mixed effects models  
using R statistical software (Team R. Core, 2014) and the lme4 package (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) with fixed factor of condition and random 
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effects (only intercepts due to convergence problems) of story and subject 
showed that ratings for im-TOM and im-NONTOM passages did not differ 
significantly: Comprehensibility means (standard deviations): im-TOM 3.62 (0.62) 
vs. im-NONTOM 3.64 (0.57), p = 0.67, Naturalness means (sds): im-TOM 3.23 
(0.79) vs. im-NONTOM 3.22 (0.77), p = 0.87.
In the scanner, the stories were presented auditorily, while the subject was 
looking at a fixation point in the centre of a computer display. After each story, 
two questions and two possible answers for each question were presented 
visually. The questions referred to the im-TOM and im-NONTOM part of the story,
thus creating the explicit conditions ex-TOM and ex-NONTOM. For example, the 
questions and answers for the above-mentioned example passages were:
Story 1A
• ex-TOM: Where did the woman think that the sandwiches were? Answers: In 
the car vs. in her husband’s stomach
• ex-NONTOM: Who had the camera when there was a series of pictures 




• ex-NONTOM: How many sandwiches were left for the woman, after the man 
had finished eating? Answers: One vs. three
• ex-TOM: Where was the camera in the opinion of the couple, after the hiker 
took pictures of them? Answers: In the backpack of the couple vs. in the 
backpack of the hiker
In order to rule out possible alternative explanations of the results for the ex-TOM
vs. ex-NONTOM contrast, questions and answers were analysed according to 
the metrics in Table 1. The following metrics were analysed using linear mixed 
effects models (package lme4) in R: 1. question length in words, 2. number of 
clauses of question (as a measurement of syntactic complexity), 3. answer length
in words and 4. question type, whether it asked about location or not. In the 
inferential statistics we used likelihood ratio tests to compare: a) the null model, 
in which only the random factor of story is included and b) the main effect of ToM,
in which the type of the question (ex-TOM vs. ex-NONTOM) as well as the 
random factor of story is included. For question and answer length the main 
effect of ToM model showed a marginally significant improvement over the null 
model (p = 0.0643 and p = 0.08183, respectively). For the criteria of number of 
clauses and question type (location vs. non-location) there was no significant 
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difference between the null and the main effect of ToM models (p = 0.1137 and p 
= 0.495, respectively).
Imaging procedure and behavioural data acquisition
Prior to the scanning procedure, a training session outside the scanner was 
performed. Participants listened to two stories and answered two questions 
subsequent to each story. The practice stimuli were not part of the experimental 
stimuli. In the scanner the participants listened to 20 stories and answered 40 
questions (two after each story). Participants heard the stories through MRI 
compatible earphones. Sound quality and loudness was optimised in the scanner
before starting the experiment. The order of the stories was assigned randomly 
and was different for each participant, in order to avoid sequence effects. The 
stories were divided into 4 blocks of 5 stories each. After each block the 
participant had a break of 45 seconds. During the break the participants saw the 
visual message “Short break!” in the middle of the screen, while the scanner was 
still running.
One story trial consisted of the following events: first a fixation cross was 
shown in the middle of the screen for 500 ms before the story started. The cross 
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was then replaced by a fixation point and at the same time the story started. The 
duration of the story was approximately 2 minutes. After the story there was a 
jitter between 1.5 and 4.5 seconds (duration assigned randomly), after which the 
first question was presented visually. The question was presented all at once, 
centred and towards the top of the screen for 5 seconds. After that, the possible 
answers appeared towards the bottom of the screen, clearly separated from each
other; each answer began with an index letter a. always on the left, and b. always
on the right side of the screen below the question (see Figure 1 for a graphical 
representation of the question and answer screens). The possible answers 
stayed on the screen until participants made their decision; however, they 
disappeared if participants took longer than 3 seconds to respond (duration 
pretested in order to ensure a natural pace of the experiment). Participants gave 
their answers by pressing the left or right button on a button box, which was fixed 
to their left leg, with their left middle or index finger accordingly. The left hand 
was chosen as a response hand in order to minimise left hemispheric artefacts 
which could overlap with linguistic processing (Callan et al. 2004). The position of
the correct answer was counterbalanced. Presentation of stimuli was time-jittered
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between story and questions and also between first and second question. All 
visual stimuli (cross, fixation point, questions and answers) were presented in 
dark grey on light grey background. Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of 
an example trial. The procedure was implemented and presented with the 
software package Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., San Francisco, 
CA).
Behavioural data analyses
For the behavioural data analyses we used R statistical software (R Core Team, 
2014) and the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2013). For both 
responses and reaction times (RTs) we calculated models with fixed factors of 
condition and question order and random factors story and subject. The first 
question always referred to the first manipulation in the story (irrespective of the 
condition) and the second question always tested the information of the second 
manipulation of the story (also irrespective of the condition). We used logistic 
regression (because both dependent and independent variables were 
categorical) in combination with the maximal random effects structure (random 
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slopes and intercept per condition and answer order for story and subject; see 
Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) for the response analyses (R function 
glmer). Due to convergence problems in the models with the maximal random 
effects structure in the RTs, we included in the models (calculated with the R 
function lmer) the most complex random effects structure that reached 
convergence (random slopes and intercept per condition for story and subject). 
To assess the effects of the different factors on the response times and 
responses, we employed a forward model selection procedure within which we 
used likelihood ratio tests to compare a base model including only an intercept 
with successively more complex models (function anova in R). 
fMRI data acquisition
During the MR-session a series of echo-planar-images was gathered to record 
the time course of the subjects’ brain activity. Measurements were performed on 
a 3 Tesla MRI system (Trio, A Tim System 3T, Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) with
a 12 channel head matrix receive coil. Functional images were acquired using a 
T2* weighted single shot echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence: parallel imaging 
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factor of 2 (GRAPPA), TE=25ms, TR=1450ms, flip angle 90°, slice thickness 4.0 
mm and 0.6 mm gap, matrix 64×64, field of view = 224×224 mm, in-plane 
resolution 3.5×3.5mm2, bandwidth 2232Hz/pixel, EPI factor of 64 and an echo 
spacing of 0.53 ms. Transversal slices oriented to the AC–PC line were gathered 
in ascending order.
The initial five images were removed from the analyses in order to avoid 
saturation and stabilization effects. Head movements of the participants were 
minimised by using foam paddings.
A whole head T1 weighted data set was acquired with a 3d MPRage sequence
(parallel imaging factor of 2 (GRAPPA), TE=2.26ms, TR=1900ms, flip angle 9°, 1 
mm isometric resolution, 176 sagittal slices, 256×256 matrix).
fMRI data analyses
All analyses for the fMRI data were calculated in SPM8 (Welcome Trust Centre 
for Neuroimaging), implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc., Sherborn, MA).
A slice time correction (to the 15th slice) was performed first. Then images 
were realigned to the first image in order to correct for head movement artefacts. 
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We normalised the volumes into standard stereotaxic anatomical Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) space by using the transformation matrix calculated 
from the first EPI scan of each subject and the EPI template. On the normalised 
data (resliced voxel size 2mm3) we applied an 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum 
(FWHM) Gaussian smoothing kernel in order to compensate for inter-subject 
anatomical variation.
For the single-subject analysis the design matrix for each subject was created 
individually, based on the log files from the fMRI-session, because each 
participant heard the stories in a different order. We modelled im-TOM and im-
NONTOM conditions in seconds (mean duration of event = 4326 ms, standard 
deviation = 1525 ms). As critical events we modelled one sentence from each 
passage: for im-TOM it was the sentence in which the protagonist had a false 
belief and for im-NONTOM it was a length-matched sentence from the control 
passage. The events of the previous examples were as follows:
Story 1A




• took a whole series of pictures from all different perspectives.
im-NONTOM
Story 1B
• With delight she ate it and drank a few sips of apple juice.
im-NONTOM
• The couple was looking for the camera without success,
im-TOM
For ex-TOM and ex-NONTOM conditions we modelled the question (5s) and 
answer (RTs) trial together as critical events (mean duration: 7.426s, sd: 1.030s); 
these events did not involve the motor response. The two trials for which there 
was no response were not modelled. As factors of no interest we modelled 
separately: the rest of the stories (excluding the im-TOM and im-NONTOM parts),
the button presses (motor responses) and the jitters before each question and 
story. Our baseline consisted of the three 45s pauses between blocks. In order to
remove movement artefacts for each individual session the realignment 
parameters were entered as multiple regressors in the first-level analysis.
On the group-level analysis, we modelled two T-contrasts between the 
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following first-level conditions: a) im-TOM vs. im-NONTOM and b) ex-TOM vs. ex-
NONTOM. Brain activations were plotted on the anatomical MRIcron 
(http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/) high resolution template 
(the Colin brain). We used the cluster extent thresholding algorithm by (Slotnick, 
Moo, Segal, & Hart, 2003), which employs a FWE correction using a Monte Carlo
simulation approach, in order to correct for multiple comparisons. We set the 
desired correction threshold for multiple comparisons to p < 0.05 and the 
assumed voxel type I error to p < 0.001; after 10000 iterations our cluster extend 
threshold was estimated at 48 voxels. For all fMRI results reported for implicit (im-
TOM vs. im-NONTOM) and explicit (ex-TOM vs. ex-NONTOM) contrasts (and the 
reverse contrasts), we employed a whole brain analysis and used an individual 
voxel threshold of p < 0.001 with a cluster extend threshold of 48 voxels.
Contrasts of interest
In addition to the contrasts im-TOM vs. im-NONTOM and ex-TOM vs. ex-
NONTOM, which test implicit and explicit ToM separately, we were interested in 
the common regions activated for both contrasts. Therefore we performed a 
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conjunction analysis using statistical parametric maps (SPMs) of the minimum T-
statistic over the previous contrasts (im-TOM vs. im-NONTOM and ex-TOM vs. 
ex-NONTOM). Inference was based on p-values adjusted for the search volume 
using random field theory (for details on the exact procedure see Friston, Penny, 
& Glaser, 2005). The SPM8 algorithm for conjunction (testing the conjunction null
hypothesis as recommended in (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 
2005)) assumes that the p-value of the conjunction is the square root of the p-
value of the involved contrasts. We set the p-value for the conjunction to 0.05, 
thereby implicitly thresholding each individual contrast at p < 0.0025. We further 
corrected the conjunction results for multiple comparisons by setting a cluster 
threshold on 120 voxels, as estimated by the Slotnick et al. (2003) algorithm after 
10000 iterations.
Results
Subjects achieved a mean of 90% (sd=5.61) correctness in the answers. The 
mean percentages of correct, incorrect and missed responses per condition are 
presented in Table 2. In a logistic mixed effects models analysis (see 
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“Behavioural data analyses” for details) we found no significant main effect of 
condition (ex-TOM vs. ex-NONTOM) for the responses (correct, incorrect and 
missed response). A comparison of the logistic mixed effects models (using the 
function anova in R) showed no significant improvement of model fit (p's > .7) of 
the main effects and interaction models in comparison to the null model (which 
included only an intercept in addition to the maximal random effects structure). 
None of the single main effects models (only main effect of condition or only main
effect of question order) improved model fit compared to the null model (p's > 
0.5).
We also analysed the response times (RTs) with mixed effects models (for the
results see Figure 2). We found no significant improvement of the model fit (p = 
0.26) when comparing the main effects model of condition and question order to 
the null model (which included only the intercept and random effects). None of 
the single main effects of condition or question order improved the model in 
comparison to both the null model and the main effects of condition and question 
order models (p's > 0.1).
In the fMRI analyses we found significant activation for im-TOM vs. im-
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NONTOM in the bilateral angular gyrus (AG), left MTG, right middle temporal pole
(MTP), bilateral precuneus (PCUN), left cerebellum (CE) (crus 2, VIII), right CE 
(IX), as well as bilateral MFG and IFG. For ex-TOM vs. ex-NONTOM, we found 
significant activation in the left AG. For the reverse implicit contrast im-NONTOM 
vs. im-TOM we found activation in the right MFG and left posterior central gyrus 
(PoCG) (p <.001, cluster extend threshold of 48 voxels). For the reverse explicit 
contrast ex-NONTOM vs. ex-TOM we found activation in the right hippocampus 
(HC) (also p <.001, cluster extend threshold of 48 voxels). An overview of the 
results for the contrasts of interest with coordinates (MNI), T-scores and cluster 
sizes is presented in Table 3 (see Figure 3 for the localisation of the results on 
the brain template).
Table 4 shows the supra-threshold clusters activated for the conjunction. We 
found supra-threshold activation for the conjunction in the left AG, MTG, MFG 
bilateral IFG as well as in the cerebellum (crus 1) (for the localisation of the 
effects see Figure 5). 
The changes of the BOLD signal, as reflected in the contrast estimates (first 
principal component of the signal) in the peak voxel, in the left AG across all 
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contrasts of interest revealed more activation for the im-TOM and ex-TOM in 
comparison to the im-NONTOM and ex-NONTOM condition respectively (see 
Figure 4). In the barplots of the contrast estimates for the implicit contrast (see 
Figure 4 and Figure 6, under the red label), it is the differences between im-TOM 
and im-NONTOM that are responsible for the implicit ToM activation. In the ex-
TOM vs. ex-NONTOM plots (see Figure 4, under the yellow label) the differences 
between ex-TOM and ex-NONTOM are driving the supra-threshold activation. 
Please note that in both implicit and explicit contrasts (ex-TOM vs. ex-NONTOM 
under the yellow label and im-TOM vs. im-NONTOM under the red label) we have
plotted all conditions of interest for the sake of completeness, even though only 
two are relevant for the activation of the contrast. For the conjunction contrast 
(see Figure 4 and Figure 6 under the green label), all four conditions contribute to
the common activation of implicit and explicit contrasts by showing the same 
tendencies in the differences between TOM and NONTOM conditions: a left 
lateralised network comprising the AG, MTG, MFG and IFG showed stronger 





In the present study, participants listened to two-minute long stories with 
embedded implicit false belief and control passages. After each story participants
answered one false belief and one control question (explicit false belief 
processing). Our main finding was that processing false beliefs incidentally in a 
rich and natural narrative context recruits ToM processing regions (AG, MTG, 
mPFC in the SmFG, precuneus) – known from the explicit ToM literature. For 
explicit false belief processing we could replicate previous results in our left AG 
findings. The conjunction analysis revealed a left lateralised network of the AG, 
MTG, MFG and IFG as the common pattern activated during both implicit and 
explicit false belief processing.
For implicit false belief processing (im-TOM vs. im-NONTOM) we found 
activation in the AG bilaterally. The AG is an anatomical subdivision of the 
posterior inferior parietal lobule (pIPL), which is considered part of the so-called 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) (Mar, 2011; Seghier, 2013). TPJ activation has 
been previously found in several story-based ToM paradigms (Aichhorn et al., 
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2009; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Kobayashi et al., 2006; Lee et 
al., 2011; Mitchell, 2008; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Vogeley et al., 2001). 
Especially the right TPJ is assumed to be heavily involved in mentalising 
processes (Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003) throughout many different situations: answering an open 
question about visually presented and cartoon stories (Gallagher et al., 2000), 
answering in a multiple choice question after visually presented stories (Spengler
et al., 2009), second-order false belief tasks (Kobayashi et al., 2006), false belief 
stories and desires also presented visually (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), reading 
TOM and SELF stories and covertly answering questions (Vogeley et al., 2001). 
All of these previous studies did not investigate or model implicit false belief 
processing separately, although it was also measured during stimulation. The 
only study from the literature that attempted to capture implicit false belief 
processing was Aichhorn et al. (2009), in which the reading of false belief stories 
was modelled separately to answering the question in two different first level 
analyses. Although another instance of automatic ToM processing has been 
tested in trait judgements (Ma et al., 2012, 2011), the current study was the first 
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to test implicit ToM in false belief processing a) in listening and b) embedded in a 
rich and natural linguistic context. Since we found TPJ activation for implicit false 
belief processing in this novel setup, we conclude that the TPJ may not only be 
active in decision-based setups but that it may also be recruited incidentally in 
implicit false belief tasks (such as mentalising during narrative processing). 
Our contribution adds to the existing literature on social cognition as part of 
language processing (Ferstl & Cramon, 2002; Ferstl, Neumann, Bogler, & 
Cramon, 2008; Mason & Just, 2009) by revealing ToM processing regions when 
people listen to stories including false belief situations. Our finding of SmFG 
(mPFC) in the implicit contrast and in the conjunction in particular is in line with 
Ferstl & Cramon (2002)'s findings of FMC activation for narrative coherence 
based on social cues. However, a more systematic study of the interplay between
social and linguistic cues in narrative processing is needed in order to draw 
conclusions about how the two domains interact on a neurobiological level.
The TPJ is one of the regions of a ToM processing network. This network 
includes (amongst others) the following regions: mPFC, IFG, MFG, MTG, CE and
PCUN (Aichhorn et al., 2009; Gallagher et al., 2000; Kobayashi et al., 2006; Lee 
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et al., 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Spengler et al., 2009). In the present study
we provided further support for this ToM network especially during implicit false 
belief processing when listening to narrative stories. Our findings specifically 
provide evidence for the claim that ToM processing regions are recruited 
spontaneously when false beliefs are embedded in natural context.
Parts of the “classical” ToM processing network have been claimed to be 
strongly involved in the default mode network (DMN). Especially the AG and the 
precuneus have repeatedly shown reliable activation during resting state fMRI 
experiments (Shehzad et al., 2009; Seghier, 2013; Utevsky et al. 2014). In 
connection to our findings and given our experimental setup, our results 
strengthen the claims for these areas (AG, PCUN) to be involved in (automatic) 
belief tracking, as explained by van der Wel et al. (2014). A similar concept to the
DMN is the human "reorienting" system (Corbetta, Patel, & Schulman, 2008), 
which distinguishes between a dorsal and a ventral attention system. Even 
though these systems are formulated in connection to visual cognition we would 
like to attempt a connection to auditory processing. In this view the AG and the 
precuneus belong to the dorsal attention system and support top-down 
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attentional control. On the other hand, the ventral attention network includes the 
MFG, the ventral frontal cortex (VFC), and the inferior parts of the TPJ (posterior 
STG) and is responsible for bottom-up reorientation. This framework could offer 
an alternative interpretation for our results in terms of attentional reorienting (for 
example as in Rothmayr et al., 2011).
Our explicit false belief contrast showed supra-threshold activation only in the 
left AG. Since there has been only one study which aimed to disentangle implicit 
and explicit false belief processing (Aichhorn et al., 2009) we can attempt a 
comparison of our explicit contrast results with their findings at Time Point 2: 
Question. Their main contrast was false belief (FB) vs. false photograph (PH). As 
this contrast was used in order to define the ROIs for the remaining contrasts, a 
fact that highlights the importance of this contrast in comparison to the remaining 
contrasts of interest, we can compare it to our explicit contrast (ex-TOM vs. ex-
NONTOM). Their results also showed activation in the left AG, as in our 
manipulation, but they included additional areas such as the anterior MTG, 
temporal pole, IFG, PCUN and mPFC. These were precisely the areas that 
showed signal changes for our implicit contrast, while they did not survive the 
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threshold for the explicit contrast. However, the conjunction pointed to the same 
clusters (left lateralised AG, MTG, IFG, MFG, CE) as commonly activated areas 
for implicit and explicit contrasts. This suggested that the explicit contrast mask 
extended to the other ToM processing areas but the effect sizes were not strong 
enough to survive the p <.001 threshold. Moreover, methodological details of 
design and modelling might also explain the differences in the findings of our 
explicit contrast to the FB vs. PH contrast of Aichhorn et al. (2009). The design 
differed in four respects: the presentation modality (listening vs. reading stories); 
the length of the stories and therefore the amount of provided context (23 
sentences vs. 2 sentences); the first level analysis (modelled critical events in 
one first level analysis vs. modelled critical events in two different first level 
analyses); the second level analysis (whole-brain vs. combined whole-brain and 
ROI analysis). Finally, due to the absence of jitters (else, the presence of a 
constant ISI of 2s) between the modelled events in Aichhorn et al. (2009) it is 
unclear how reliably the contributions of each conditions to the overlapping BOLD
response could have been estimated. In contrast to this, in our study of narrative 
stories, the context of the story created a natural jitter between the events of the 
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implicit contrast. Also, for the explicit contrast we optimised our design for 
efficient modelling of the hemodynamic response by introducing ISIs (jitters) of 
random duration (1.5 – 4.5s) between story and question as well as between the 
first and second question.
Despite the single cluster activation for the explicit contrast, the pattern of left 
lateralised activation revealed by the conjunction of the two contrasts of interest 
was in line with the ToM processing network known from the imaging literature. 
This left lateralisation might be connected to the nature of the stimuli, which 
comprised of false belief situations presented auditorily and embedded in rich 
linguistic context.
We have to acknowledge two minor limitations in our paradigm. First, it might 
be the case that the questions (explicit ToM) pointed participants towards what 
was tested in the study. However, these questions comprised only half of the total
number of asked questions. There was always a control question in addition to 
the false belief question after each story and the order of the two questions was 
counterbalanced across the whole experiment. Moreover, the formulations of the 
false belief questions were very variable, so that we did not repeat the words 
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“think”, “opinion”, etc., too often during the experiment. In addition, the stories 
include a wide variety of situations of which the experimental manipulations 
constitute not even half of the total duration of one story. Thus, participants can 
be keeping track of more things at different times during the story: e.g. they might
have followed the path that the hikers took (in the hiking story mentioned in the 
Stimuli section).
The second limitation is related to the order of the presented conditions; in our 
design the implicit condition always preceded the explicit condition, which means 
that the two conditions were not totally independent in time. This might have 
caused more common activation than if these two conditions were measured 
completely independently. However, other experimental solutions, such as asking
the false belief questions after the fMRI scan session, would also be suboptimal, 
since remembering the plots of 20 stories would be very demanding and lead to a
high number of incorrect answers. We chose to ask two questions after each 
story not only in order to test false belief processing in explicit mode, but also to 
make sure that the participants were alert and paying attention to the stories. 
Since two of our participants almost fell asleep repeatedly during scanning (these
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data sets were excluded from the analyses), we have to accept that it might be 
difficult to lay in the MRI scanner for one hour listening to stories without falling 
asleep, despite the noisy environment of the scanning procedure and the task.
Conclusions
In the present study we showed that the "classical" ToM processing network (e.g. 
TPJ, mPFC, MTG, PCUN) is activated during implicit false belief processing, 
while listening to short stories. We were the first to reliably disentangle implicit 
and explicit ToM processing by modelling short false-belief sentences within 
longer stories and by separating them futher from the explicit false belief task. 
Our study therefore offers insights to the neural underpinnings of auditory 
language processing and social competence, integral parts of human nature long
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Figure 1: One example trial. The trial began with a fixation cross, then a fixation 
point was shown during the whole story (approximately 2 minutes). Next, the 
question screen appeared for 5 seconds and after this the answer screen (which 
still included the question) was shown for maximally 3 seconds. After that, the 
screens of second question and answer appeared with the same durations as the
first question and answer screens.
Figure 2: Reaction times (RTs) for the First and Second question after each story 
for the ex-TOM and ex-NONTOM conditions. Abbreviations: cor: correct 
response, inc: incorrect response.
Figure 3: The contrast im-TOM vs. im-NONTOM is depicted in red and ex-TOM 
vs. ex-NONTOM in yellow, superimposed on a high resolution brain template (the
Colin brain) of the MRIcron software (p <.001, cluster extend threshold of 48 
voxels, Monte Carlo corrected). Abbreviations: AG: angular gyrus, SmFG: 
superior medial frontal gyrus, mPFC: medial prefrontal cortex, MTG: middle 
temporal gyrus, MFG: middle frontal gyrus, CE: cerebellum, PCUN: precuneus. 
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Coordinates: a) MNI: -56, -58, 32, b) MNI: -60, -24, -10, c) MNI: 46, 22, 38, d) 
MNI: -8, -48, 44.
Figure 4: Bar plots of BOLD signal changes (contrast estimates) at the peak voxel
of the left (LH) angular gyrus (AG) for implicit and explicit false belief processing 
as well as their conjunction. Threshold for the implicit and explicit contrasts: p 
<.001 and cluster extend threshold of 48 voxels (Monte Carlo corrected), for the 
conjunction p <.05 and cluster extend threshold of 120 voxels (Monte Carlo 
corrected). The error bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Please note that 
the peak voxel of the LH AG is the same for the explicit contrast and the 
conjunction, therefore the barplots are also the same.
Figure 5: The activations of the conjunction of the contrasts im-TOM vs. im-
NONTOM and ex-TOM vs. ex-NONTOM are shown in green (conjunction voxel 
threshold of p <.05 and cluster extend threshold of 120 voxels, Monte Carlo 
corrected). Abbreviations: AG: angular gyrus, MTG: middle temporal gyrus, MFG:
middle frontal gyrus, IFG: inferior frontal gyrus. Coordinates: a) MNI: -56, -58, 32,
b) MNI: -52, -46, -14, c) MNI: -42, 28, -12.
Figure 6: Bar plots of BOLD signal changes (contrast estimates) at the peak voxel
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of each cluster for implicit false belief processing and the conjunction of implicit 
and explicit contrasts. Abbreviations: RH: right hemisphere, LH: left hemisphere, 
AG: angular gyrus, SmFG: superior medial frontal gyrus, mPFC: medial 
prefrontal cortex, MTG: middle temporal gyrus, MTP: middle temporal pole, MFG:
middle frontal gyrus, PCUN: precuneus. Please note that we have placed the 
plots for precuneus, AG and IFG next to each other for illustration reasons and 
with absolutely no intention of denoting that they are overlapping regions. For 
explicit and implicit contrasts: individual voxel threshold of p <.001 and cluster 
extend threshold of 48 voxels (Monte Carlo corrected). For the conjunction: 
individual voxel threshold of p <.05 and cluster extend threshold of 120 voxels 
(Monte Carlo corrected). The error bars represent 90% confidence intervals.
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Table 1: Question and answer details for the contrast ex-TOM vs. ex-NONTOM. The inferential 
statistics represent model comparison of two models: a) the null model, in which only the 
random factor of story is included and b) the main effect of ToM, in which the type of the 
question (ex-TOM vs. ex-NONTOM) as well as the random factor of story is included.
Metric All ex-TOM ex-NONTOM
Mean (standard 
deviation)
Question length in 
words
8.9 (3) 9.5 (3.2) 8.3 (2.8)
p = 0.06
Number of clauses of 
the question
1.5 (0.5) 1.6 (0.5) 1.4 (0.5)
p = 0.11
Answer length in words 3.7 (1.9) 3.9 (2.2) 3.5 (1.5)
p = 0.08
Percentage (Number)
Location content of 
question
58.8% (47/80) 62.5% (25/40) 55% (22/40)
p = 0.49




Not answered 1 2
Table 3: False belief activation peaks with their local maxima coordinates for the contrasts im-
TOM vs. im-NONTOM and ex-TOM vs. ex-NONTOM (p <.001, cluster extend threshold 48 
voxels). Coordinates are listed in MNI atlas space (H: hemisphere, mPFC: medial prefrontal 
cortex).
Contrast Anatomical region H MNI Coordinates T Cluster size
im-TOM vs. im-
NONTOM
Angular gyrus (AG) L -58 -64 30 7.64 2121
Cerebellum (CE) – Crus 2 L -24 -82 -34 7.19 2853
Angular gyrus (AG) R 56 -60 30 7.1 2812
Precuneus (PCUN) L -8 -48 44 6.23 860
Middle frontal gyrus (MFG) L -22 52 24 5.89 1620
Superior medial frontal
gyrus (SmFG) – mPFC
L -4 48 38 5.68 1620
Middle frontal gyrus (MFG) L -40 12 46 5.28 806
Middle temporal pole (MTP) R 50 8 -28 5.03 257
Middle frontal gyrus (MFG) R 24 24 44 4.97 236
Middle temporal gyrus
(MTG)
L -60 -24 -10 4.71 410
Precuneus (PCUN) R 12 -50 40 4.4 860
Superior frontal gyrus (SFG) R 26 58 18 4.4 88
Middle frontal gyrus (MFG) R 46 22 38 4.3 217
Superior frontal gyrus (SFG) L -32 52 0 4.3 52
Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) –
Pars triangularis
L -56 26 6 4.11 297
Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) –
Pars orbitalis
L -50 28 -6 4 297
ex-TOM vs. ex-
NONTOM
Angular gyrus (AG) L -56 -58 32 3.76 75
Table 4: Activation peaks with their local maxima coordinates for the conjunction of the contrasts
im-TOM vs. im-NONTOM and ex-TOM vs. ex-NONTOM (threshold p <.05, cluster minimum of 
120 voxels, Monte Carlo corrected). Coordinates are listed in MNI atlas space (H: hemisphere).
Contrast Anatomical region H MNI Coordinates T Cluster size
Conjunction
Angular gyrus (AG) L -56 -58 32 3.76 1363
Middle frontal gyrus (MFG) L -40 20 48 2.61 487
Middle temporal gyrus (MTG) L -52 -36 -14 2.42 484
Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) –
Pars triangularis
R 54 30 28 2.37 135
Cerebellum (Crus 1) R 28 -80 -32 2.33 293
Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) L -42 28 -12 2.31 139





